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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are the manager of a major, government-owned stadium
where professional athletic teams play their games. Team owners (who
lease the facility from the government) want to encourage fans to bring
banners and signs to the games but want to ensure that such banners satisfy
certain standards. The owners want limitations on the size of the banners
and want their messages to be game-related. They are worried that some
banners will contain offensive or inappropriate language. In addition, the
owners, ever conscious of the television audience, do not want their
"product" invaded by what might be uncomfortable political or religious
slogans. How can the owners' desire to encourage "team spirit" be
facilitated while still maintaining significant control?
Two recent cases are examples of how the results of this balancing act
can be unconstitutional. In Aubrey v. City of Cincinnati' and Stewart v.
District of Columbia,2 federal district judges ruled that stadium banner
policies, in Cincinnati's Riverfront Stadium and Washington D.C.'s RFK
Stadium respectively, facially violated the First Amendment.3 Using these
two decisions as a guide, this Note examines three First Amendment
obstacles facing those who wish to create and enforce banner policies at
government-owned athletic facilities.4 Part II of this Note briefly discusses
the two principle cases and outlines the First Amendment pitfalls. Part MI
discusses the most significant of these pitfalls-maintaining nonpublic
forum status. Finally, Part IV discusses the related problems of
overbreadth and vagueness.
1 815 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
2 789 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1992).
3 Aubrey, 815 F. Supp. at 1104; Stewart, 789 F. Supp. at 406.
4 Of course the bulk of the First Amendment analysis in this Note is applicable to
other instances where speech is being regulated on or at government-owned property.
However, the purpose of this Note is to focus on the distinct problems encountered by
the defending parties in the stadium banner policy cases.
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II. THE PRINcIPAL CASES: EXAMPLES OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT PITFALLS
A. The Aubrey v. City of Cincinnati Decision
On October 17, 1990, the Cincinnati Reds (Reds) played the Oakland
Athletics in game two of the World Series.5 One of the fans in attendance
was Reverend Guy Anthony Aubrey who brought a sign measuring two
feet by three feet inscribed with the phrase "John 3:16."6 Pursuant to a
written banner policy, 7 Reds security officers confronted Aubrey, escorted
him to a security room, notified him that he could not display his sign, and
confiscated the sign until the conclusion of the game. 8 Aubrey brought a
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory judgment, compensa-
tory and punitive damages, and injunctive relief.9
On Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, United States
District Court Judge S. Arthur Spiegel ruled that the Reds's banner policy
was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.10 Noting that the courts have
disagreed in their approach to speech rights at athletic events, 11 the court
discussed that the overbreadth doctrine could invalidate a regulation
5 Aubrey, 815 F. Supp. at 1102.
6 Id. at 1103. John 3:16 (New Revised Standard Version) [hereinafter NRSV]
states: "For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who
believes in him may not perish but may have eternal life."
7 The written banner policy stated:
[B]allpark patrons are permitted to bring signs and banners to the Stadium. They
must be in good taste (as determined by Reds [sic] management) or the banner
will be removed.... The only restrictions are the banners cannot interfere with
the sight-line of the batter, pitcher or umpire looking down the foul line or in any
way that obstructs the view of anyone in the stands. Reds [sic] management
reserves the right to remove any banner or sign that is viewed to be in bad taste or
is causing an obstruction.
Aubrey, 815 F. Supp. at 1102. While not expressly stating it, the Reds maintained that
the policy had "always been understood to mean that all allowable signs must be
game-related." Id. In addition to their banner policy, the Reds were encouraged by
Major League Baseball not to allow religious signs in the stadium. Id. at 1103.
8Id. at 1103.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 1106.
11 Id. at 1103. In fact the court conceded that the case "raises a question of free
speech on the outer edges of the First Amendment." Id.
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regardless of whether the speech rights of the plaintiff were violated. 12 The
overbreadth doctrine's goal "is to avoid 'chill[ing] the expressive activity
of others not before the court.'"13 Furthermore, a regulation limiting
freedom of speech "may be struck down as overbroad when it delegates
excessive discretion in a decision maker to determine whether certain
speech is permissible." 14 The court pointed out that in Board of Airport
Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.,15 the Supreme Court had
invalidated an airport regulation "subject to multiple, contradictory
interpretations" without addressing the ultimate substantive issue of how
much speech could be regulated in an airport terminal. 16
Applying these principles, Judge Spiegel found unconstitutional
overbreadth in the banner policy's use of the terminology "good taste" and
the Reds's understanding of "baseball related." 17 Reds's employees could
not agree as to what constituted "good taste" as the Reds had defined it. 18
The banner policy left "too much discretion in the decision maker without
any standards ... [upon which] to base his or her determination."' 9 Thus,
Judge Spiegel did not hesitate to declare the banner policy unconstitutional
as facially overbroad and vague. 20
B. The Stewart v. District of Columbia Armory Board Decision
On January 4, 1992, the Washington Redskins were playing in a
postseason football game, and Edwin Thate, Jr. was in attendance at RFK
Stadium. 21 Before and during the game, Thate placed two signs in the
stadium-one reading "John 3:3" and the other reading "Mark 8:36."22
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1104 (quoting Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct.
2395, 2401 (1992)).
14 Id. at 1103 (citing Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395,
2401 (1992)). Here the court fails to distinguish between overbreadth and vagueness.
See infra part IV.B.
15 482 U.S. 569, 576 (1987).
16 Aubrey, 815 F. Supp. at 1104.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Stewart v. District of Columbia Armory Bd., 789 F. Supp. 402, 403-04
(D.D.C. 1992).
22 Id. John 3:3 (NRSV) states: "Jesus answered him, 'Very truly, I tell you, no
one can see the kingdom of God without being born from above.'" Mark 8:36 (NRSV)
questions: "For what will it profit them to gain the whole world and forfeit their life?"
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Employees of the District of Columbia Armory Board23 removed both
signs at the direction of the National Football League and pursuant to an
Armory Board regulation requiring that banners "pertain to the event." 24
On January 10, 1992, Thate and two others filed an action in federal
district court to enjoin the Armory Board from preventing the display of
religious signs.25 On that day, United States District Judge Joyce Hens
Green granted plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction on the following two grounds: (1) RFK
Stadium is a public forum, and therefore, the Armory Board can only limit
speech pursuant to a compelling state interest which did not exist in this
case, and (2) the regulation was overbroad and vague.26
First, the court determined that RFK Stadium was a public forum by
government designation in that the Armory Board consistently failed to
remove non-event-related signs in the past including religious signs placed
by the plaintiffs. 27 This being so, the court ruled that the Armory Board
could not justify its actions against the "compelling state interest" test
applicable in a public forum. 28 Concern about offending fans, team
owners, tenants, and the NFL was held not to be a compelling state interest
and, in addition, was held to be evidence of viewpoint discrimination. 29
Second, the court ruled that the banner regulation was overbroad and
vague.30 Citing and discussing Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for
23 The District of Columbia Armory Board "is an independent government
agency established by Congress and charged with the responsibility of constructing,
maintaining, and operating RFK Stadium .... ." Stewart, 789 F. Supp. at 404.
2 4 Id. at 403-04. The banner regulation allowed signs to be exhibited if the
following conditions were met: (1) the banner pertained to the event, (2) the banner
was not commercial, vulgar or derogatory, and (3) the dimensions of the banner did
not exceed 4' x 6'. Id. at 403.25 Id.
26 Id. at 404-06.
27 Id. at 405.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 405-06. Viewpoint discrimination occurs when some views on a
particular subject are allowed and the opposing or differing views are not allowed.
This is contrasted with "content-based regulations" which prohibit an entire subject
matter. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.
Ct. 2141, 2147 (1993) ("That all religions and all uses for religious purposes are
treated alike under Rule 7 [content-based discrimination], however, does not answer
the critical question whether it discriminates on a basis of viewpoint to permit school
property to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child-
rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint
[viewpoint discrimination].").30 Stewart, 789 F. Supp. at 406.
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Jesus,31 Judge Green held that the Armory Board regulation failed to
define key terms, and thus, allowed excessive discretion by officials
enforcing the policy.3 2 "mhe fact that defendants' officials alone have the
power to decide in the first instance whether a given activity is related to
the event itself presents serious constitutional difficulty." 33 As a result, the
RFK Stadium banner policy was effectively declared unconstitutional. 34
C. An Outline of the First Amendment Pitfalls
Aubrey and Stewart provide examples of the three main First
Amendment pitfalls facing officials who wish to encourage the display of
banners, but that prohibit those banners which are not game-related or
might cause religious or political discomfort.3 5 First, and most
importantly, stadium officials must ensure that the stadium is not deemed a
public forum. As seen in Stewart, once the stadium is declared a public
forum, all limitations on speech must satisfy a rigorous, strict scrutiny test
which does not allow content-based discrimination against political or
religious messages. Second, a banner policy must not be overbroad-it
must not be drafted so as to significantly chill otherwise protected speech.
Finally, the banner policy must not be vague-it must be drafted in a way
as to be clearly understood and not allow excessive discretion by
enforcement personnel.
III. THE PROBLEM OF BEING A PUBLic FORUM
A. An Overview of the Public Forum Doctrine: The Perry Approach
The public forum doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court over
many years but was not clearly enunciated until the Court's 1983 decision
31 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
32 Id. To illustrate its point, the court highlighted the banner regulation terms
"vulgar," "derogatory," and "pertain to the event" as failing to be adequately defined.
Id.
33 Id.
34 I use the word "effectively" because pursuant to a motion for a temporary
restraining order the court need only determine if the plaintiff would likely succeed on
the merits. See id. at 404.
35 It should be noted that this analysis and Note only apply when First
Amendment principles are deemed applicable. First Amendment scrutiny may not
apply in stadiums not owned by any governmental body or where the government is
not involved in enacting or enforcing the policy.
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in Perry Education Ass'n v. Peny Local Educators' Ass'n.36 In Perry, the
petitioner, Perry Education Association (PEA), was the duly elected
exclusive bargaining representative for the teachers of the Metropolitan
School District of Perry Township, Indiana. 37 As part of the collective-
bargaining agreement, PEA was the only union permitted to have access to
the interschool mail system and teachers' mailboxes in the schools. 38
Respondent Perry Local Educators' Association, a rival teachers' union,
filed suit arguing that being denied the use of teachers' mailboxes violated
inter alia the First Amendment.39
Writing for the majority, Justice White rejected the First Amendment
claim, and in the process, he classified three types of government-owned
property, each with a corresponding First Amendment standard.40 The first
type of government-owned property is the traditional public forum, the
second type includes property designated as a public forum by the
government, and the third type consists of property which is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public expression.41
Traditional public forums are created when they "have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions." 42 These "quintessential public
forums," 43 such as public parks and streets, provide the highest level of
First Amendment protection. Content-based regulations must serve a
compelling state interest. 44 Time, place, and manner regulations must be
36 460 U.S. 37 (1983). For a more detailed overview of the public forum
doctrine, see generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL
LAW §§ 16.45-16.46 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing the history and implementation of the
public forum doctrine); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 12-4 to 12-25 (2d ed. 1988) (delineating public, semipublic, and private forums);
Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis:
Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219 (1984);
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theoy of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
37 Peny, 460 U.S. at 38-39.
38 Id. at 39.
39 Id. at 41.
40 Id. at 44-54.
41 Id. at 45-46. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 36, § 16.46, at
1090-93 (analyzing the significance of Perry).
42 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
43 Id.
44Id.; see, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (holding that a
Tennessee statute prohibiting election day campaigning within 100 feet of a polling
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content neutral, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and must leave ample alternative channels of
communication. 45
Public forums by designation consist of property that the government
"has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity. "46 The
government is not required to create these forums, nor is the government
required to maintain the open character of them. 47 However, as long as the
forum is open, the government is bound by the same First Amendment
standards applied to the traditional public forum-content-based restrictions
can only be applied upon satisfying the compelling state interest test and
satisfying the reasonable time, place, and manner limitations.48
The third category consists of government-owned property that is not a
public forum by tradition or designation. 49 The First Amendment does not
require complete protection for all government-owned or operated
property.50 In this category, the government may control the property's use
consistent with its purpose.51 "In addition to time, place, and manner
regulation, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is
place was a content-based restriction in a public forum but satisfied the compelling
state interest test); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding that a city ordinance
prohibiting the critical picketing of an embassy was a content-based restriction in a
public forum and did not satisfy the compelling state interest test); see also Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-19 (1972).
45 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)
(holding that a federal statute prohibiting picketing in or on the Supreme Court
grounds was not a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction); Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding a National
Park Service regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks as a reasonable time,
place, and manner restriction).
46 Peny, 460 U.S. at 45.
47 Id. at 45-46.
48 Id.; see, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that public
university meeting places constituted designated public forums and that regulation
prohibiting use for religious purposes violated the First Amendment); Madison Joint
Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)
(holding that a school board meeting is a designated public forum and that prohibiting
certain teachers from speaking violated the First Amendment); Flower v. United
States, 407 U.S. 197 (1975) (holding that an open street through a military fort is a
designated public forum and thus authorities could not prohibit distribution of leaflets
by pedestrians on the street).
49 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view."5 2 Justice White found the school
district internal mail system to be just such a forum.5 3 Consequently, the
Perry Local Educators' Association's First Amendment challenge was
denied. 54
When determining if a government-owned property is a public forum,
the primary factor on which courts focus is the specific property's location
and purpose. 55 For example, not all government-owned sidewalks are
public forums. A sidewalk on the perimeter of a government-owned
building may be a public forum if the sidewalk is indistinguishable from
and is used as any other public sidewalk.56 However, a sidewalk designed
and constructed solely to provide clear passage for those wishing to enter
and do business within the government-owned building might not be a
public forum. 57 Thus, the public forum doctrine requires a case-by-case
52 Id.; see, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113
S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (holding that even if a school facility is not a public forum,
excluding the use of such facilities to religious views about family issues and child-
rearing, after such facilities had been open to other viewpoints on these issues,
violated the requirement that regulations be viewpoint neutral); International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (concurring opinion
reported seperately at 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992)) (holding that airport terminals were not
a public forum and that regulations prohibiting solicitation were reasonable); Lee v.
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) (concurring opinion
reported seperately at 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992)) (holding that even though airport
terminals are not public forums, a regulation prohibiting the distribution of literature
was not reasonable); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (holding that a
sidewalk leading from parking lot to post office is neither a traditional nor a
designated public forum and that a regulation prohibiting solicitation there was
reasonable); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985) (holding that a charity drive directed at federal employees was not a public
forum and that regulations excluding the participation of legal defense and political
organizations was reasonable); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974) (upholding ban on political advertisements in city transit vehicles which were
declared not to be public forums).
53 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
54 1d. at 55.
55 Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 728-29 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
(1983)).
56 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179 (1983) (holding that the
sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court building grounds are public
forums).
57 See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 729 (holding sidewalk leading to U.S. Post Office
building not to be a public forum).
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analysis into the functional purposes and uses of specific government-
owned properties.
Although the public forum doctrine often has been criticized,5 8 there is
no evidence that the Supreme Court intends to abandon its principles. 59 As
a result, it is vital that stadium officials wishing to regulate speech through
banner policies avoid strict scrutiny by ensuring that their stadiums are not
categorized as public forums. 60
B. The Stadium Cases: An Overview
As alluded to by Judge Spiegel in Aubrey v. City of Cincinnati,61
stadiums have been declared both public and nonpublic forums by the
courts. Consistent with the public forum doctrine, the courts have engaged
in a case-specific factual inquiry into the functional purpose and use of the
particular stadium, and as a result, the courts have avoided categorical
pronouncements that all government-owned stadiums are or are not public
forums. 62 The majority of the cases have found stadiums not to be public
forums.
6 3
58 Post, supra note 36, at 1715 & n.7; see, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 36, §§ 12-24
to 12-26; R. Alexander Acosta, Recent Development, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
269 (1993); Ronald A. Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65
VA. L. R v. 1287, 1308-09 (1979); Lonnie S. Davis, Note, Board of Airport
Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.: A Missed Opportunity to Restore Fundamental
Fairness to Public Forum Analysis, 8 PAcE L. REv. 607, 626-30 (1988); Marianne E.
Dixon, Note, International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: The
Failure of the Public Forum Doctrine to Protect Free Speech, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J.
437, 458-64 (1993); Farber & Nowak, supra note 36, at 1224.
59 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.
Ct. 2141 (1993); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S.
Ct. 2701 (1992) (concurring opinion reported seperately at 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992));
Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) (concurring
opinion reported seperately at 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992)); Burson v. Freeman, 112 S.
Ct. 1846 (1992); Boos v. Barry, 458 U.S. 312 (1988).
60 See Stewart v. District of Columbia Armory Bd., 789 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C.
1992); see also supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
61 815 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (S.D. Ohio 1993); see supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
62 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that in one
factual situation, a government-owned stadium was not a public forum, and that under
a different factual situation another government-owned stadium was a public forum.
Compare Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1986) ith Paulsen v.
County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1991).
63 See infra text accompanying notes 64-77.
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1. Cases Finding Stadiums not to be Public Forums
Courts which have held that a stadium is not a public forum have
generally emphasized that the purpose and intent of a stadium are limited
and primarily business-like in nature.64
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey
Sports and Exposition Authority,65 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit upheld a regulation prohibiting the solicitation of money by outside
organizations in the Meadowlands Sports Complex in New Jersey. 66 The
court pointed out that the Meadowlands was not analogous to the
traditional public forum such as streets and parks, nor was the
Meadowlands similar to "theatres and auditoriums" created for the primary
purpose of communication and the public exchange of ideas.67
Significantly, the court ruled that:
Instead, the Meadowlands is a commercial venture by the state. It is
designed to bring economic benefits to northern New Jersey, and is
expected to generate at least enough revenue to meet its current expenses
and debt service. It earns money by attracting and entertaining spectators
with athletic events and horse races. The complex is not intended to be a
public forum, and it is not unreasonable for the Authority to prohibit
outside groups from engaging in activities which are counterproductive to
its objectives. 68
Because being solicited "is not what a patron bargained for, and it does not
tend to make his visit to the sport complex more pleasurable," the
regulation was reasonable. 69
This reasoning was also followed by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit when it upheld a sport complex's exclusive advertising
contract in Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities
Commission.70 According to the court, the Metrodome was intended to be
a sports complex not a public forum. 71 Created by the Twin Cities as a
commercial venture, the Metrodome's purposes were "to meet the need for
64 See infra text accompanying notes 65-77.
65 691 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1982).
66 Id. at 158.
67 Id. at 161 (citing TIBE, supra note 36, at 689-90).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 162.
70 797 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
71 Id. at 555.
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a major sports facility" and to "provide economic benefits to the area." 72
As a result, the stadium was found not to be a public forum.73
This lack of intent to create a public forum was significant to the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Calash v. City of Bridgeport.74 In
Calash, the court upheld a regulation prohibiting the use of a municipal
stadium for profit-making endeavors. 75 According to the court, the city did
not intend to open the stadium to the general public.76 The city designated
the stadium as a "service facility" and had consistently allowed only
selective access. 77 Consequently, the stadium was held not to be a public
forum by designation.
2. Cases Finding Stadiums to be a Public Forum
The only reported cases to hold that a government-owned stadium is a
public forum are the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia decision of
Stewart v. District of Columbia Armory Board78 and the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit decision of Paulsen v. County of Nassau.79
In Paulsen, the court ruled that prohibiting the distribution of materials
on sidewalks of a county-owned coliseum violated the Constitution.80
Applying the public forum doctrine, the court ruled that while the county
asserted that it had not intended the coliseum to be a public forum,
objective factors did not support such a claim.81 Provisions of the county
charter evidenced that the coliseum was intended to be used for many
purposes including "general public interest." 8 2 Furthermore, there was
evidence that officials had failed to consistently limit expressive activities
on the coliseum grounds, including solicitation of contributions and the
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 788 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1986).
75 1d. at 81.
76 Id. at 83.
77 Id.
78 789 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1992); see supra text accompanying notes 21-33.
79 925 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1991). It should be noted however that in Carreras v.
City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985), the court ruled that Anaheim
Stadium was a public forum under California state constitutional principles, and that in
Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1054 (1985), the court held that a municipally-owned amphitheater was a public
forum by designation under the U.S. Constitution.
80 Paulsen, 925 F.2d at 67.
81 Id. at 69.
82 Id. (quoting § 2206-a(2)(a) of the Nassau County Charter).
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distribution of literature.83 As a result, the county coliseum had become a
public forum by designation.
As the stadium cases show, officials must objectively demonstrate the
nonpublic nature of a government-owned stadium. Important factors that
stadium officials should consider include the reasons why the stadium was
constructed in the first place,8 4 the commercial nature of its operations, s5
the written policies stating its purpose,8 6 and the consistency of enforcing
regulations limiting expressive activities.8 7
IV. THE RELATED PROBLEMS OF OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS
In addition to the problem of maintaining nonpublic forum status,
officials who desire to regulate the content of stadium banners must
consider the related problems of overbreadth and vagueness. 88
A. The Problem of Overbreadth
In First Amendment jurisprudence, a regulation limiting speech may be
facially unconstitutional if it is overbroad.8 9 An overbroad statute or
regulation is one which is designed to prohibit or limit unprotected speech,
but its scope includes speech protected by the First Amendment.9" Thus,
an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted
to challenge a statute on its face "because it also threatens others not
before the court-those who desire to engage in legally protected
83 Id. at 70.
84 See supra text accompanying notes 68, 72.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 68, 72.
86 See supra text accompanying notes 77, 82.
87 See supra text accompanying note 83.
88 See supra part If.
89 Aubrey v. City of Cincinnati, 815 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (S.D. Ohio 1993). For
a more detailed overview of the overbreadth doctrine, see generally NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 36, § 16.8; TRIBE, supra note 36, §§ 12-27 to 12-33; Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991); Henry P.
Monoghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1982); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The First
Amendment Rule Against Overbreadth, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 259 (1979).
90 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 36, § 16.8, at 944.
[Vol. SS: 11431154
GOVERNMENT-OWWED STADIUMS
expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution
or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid." 91
However, this chilling effect on protected speech must be substantial in
order for the statute or regulation to be declared void as overbroad. 92
In an overbreadth challenge, a court's crucial task is to determine
whether the regulation "sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be
punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 93 What may or
may not be prohibited under the First and Fourteenth Amendments depends
upon the level of First Amendment protection existing when or where the
statute applies. If the statute only applies in situations where First
Amendment protection is minimal, then the likelihood of the statute being
overbroad is slight. 94 Consequently, in cases involving regulations of
speech on government-owned property, a court must first determine the
type of forum that exists, and thus the level of First Amendment protection
afforded, before it can determine if protected speech is being chilled.
For officials wishing to regulate the content of banners in government-
owned stadiums this aspect of the overbreadth doctrine is significant.
While the stadium is deemed a nonpublic forum, it is likely that almost any
regulation limiting the content of banners will prevail in an overbreadth
challenge. 95 Officials of a nonpublic forum stadium may regulate speech as
long as the regulation is reasonable and viewpoint neutral. 96 Given that a
prohibition of all banners is reasonable (because of safety or clean-up
concerns) and viewpoint neutral (because it does not discriminate between
different religious beliefs), a fan could not complain that a prohibition of
only some banners-those which are religious, political, or vulgar-is
91 Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)
(quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985)).92 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
93 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
94 See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (holding that a commercial regulation was not unconstitutionally
overbroad because it only potentially implicated speech that the government could
regulate or ban).
95 In Aubrey, the court applied the overbreadth doctrine without first deciding the
type of forum. Aubrey v. City of Cincinnati, 815 F. Supp. 1100 (1993). As suggested
supra note 14, the court was actually applying the void-for-vagueness doctrine. See
also infra part IV.B.
96 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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overbroad. 97 Because no banner can claim First Amendment protection, the
decision to prohibit some banners cannot be unconstitutionally overbroad.
B. The Problem of Vagueness
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, like the overbreadth doctrine, can
facially invalidate a statute or regulation designed to limit expressive
activities. Statutes are void-for-vagueness if they "are so unclear that
people of ordinary intelligence would need to guess at whether their
conduct was or was not forbidden."98 There are two rationales for the
void-for-vagueness doctrine. First, like overbroad regulations, vague
regulations deter or chill otherwise protected speech because the citizens
cannot be certain to what extent the regulations apply. 99 Second, vague
regulations, because they lack clear guidelines, create an environment in
which those enforcing the regulations will do so "on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. " 10
The chilling effect rationale of the void-for-vagueness doctrine suffers
from the same limitations as the overbreadth analysis. 10 1 A regulation,
even if vague, does not chill protected speech if the regulation occurs in a
situation in which the speech being chilled is not otherwise protected. As
in an overbreadth doctrine challenge to banner policies, 102 banner policies
in stadiums deemed nonpublic forums should prevail over a void-for-
vagueness challenge grounded simply upon the chilling effect rationale.
Even though terms such as "religious," "political," or "vulgar" may not
be entirely clear, the only speech which could be chilled by such banner-
limiting regulations would necessarily apply only to speech in stadium
banners, since all banner speech, in a nonpublic forum, can be limited (or
97 Professor Richard H. Fallon provides an analogous example: A statute which
prohibits some, but not all, obscene publications cannot be overbroad "since no
publication could fall within the prohibition unless it were 'obscene' in the
constitutional sense, and therefore constitutionally unprotected." Fallon, supra note
89, at 905.
98 Id. at 903-04; see Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding that a
city ordinance prohibiting the assembly of three or more persons on a sidewalk in a
manner annoying to others was unconstitutionally vague).
99 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972); see also NoWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 36, § 14.36, at 950; Fallon, supra note 89 at 867-68.
100 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972); see also NOwAK &
RoTuNDA, supra note 36, §16.9, at 950.
101 See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
102 See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
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even eliminated) by viewpoint neutral regulations, there is no "banner
speech" to be protected.103
However, the second rationale for the void-for-vagueness doctrine is
distinct from those supporting the overbreadth doctrine. As a result,
stadium officials must be more aware of void-for-vagueness challenges
grounded on the "excessive discretion" rationale. 104 Even in a nonpublic
forum, speech regulations must be viewpoint neutral. 10 5 Thus, banner
regulations using the terms "game related" or "baseball related" allow
excessive discretion to those enforcing the regulation which risks selective
enforcement based on viewpoint. 106 Regulations which prohibit religious,
vulgar, or political banners, however, need not succumb to this criticism.
First, regulations which prohibit all religious, vulgar, or political
banners do not constitute viewpoint discrimination since all such banners,
not just those with particular religious, vulgar, or political views are
prohibited.107 Second, unlike the simple phrase "game related," the words
religious, vulgar, or political can be defined with examples designed to
provide guidance to enforcement personnel.10 8
V. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the two principal cases, Aubrey v. City of Cincinnati
and Stewart v. District of Columbia Armory Board, there are three major
First Amendment pitfalls facing officials wishing to regulate the content of
banners in government-owned stadiums. However, all three of these pitfalls
can be avoided. Officials, through policy and practice, can ensure that the
stadium is deemed a nonpublic forum allowing greater restriction on
expressive activity. Careful drafting of policies and their consistent
enforcement can likely eliminate challenges based on the overbreadth or
void-for-vagueness doctrines. As a result, banner policies in government-
owned stadiums need not face the same result as those at Riverfront and
RFK stadiums.
103 See supra text accompanying note 97.
104 See supra part II.
105 See supra text accompanying note 52.
106 See supra part II; Aubrey v. City of Cincinnati, 815 F. Supp. 1100, 1104
(S.D. Ohio 1993).10 7 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985) (holding that a regulation excluding the participation of legal defense and
political organizations from federal employee charity drive was viewpoint neutral).
108 For example: "religious" would include any reference to God, a diety, or
scripture passages.
1994] 1157

